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Nisbett et al. (2001) claim that Easterners are more likely to use 
holistic thinking to solve problems, whereas Westerners are more 
likely to use analytic thinking. This distinction in cognitive 
behaviors has often been explained by using a framework based on 
the fact that Western culture favors independent self-construal 
(individualist culture) and Eastern culture favors interdependent 
self-construal (collectivist culture). However, we propose another 
possible cultural explanation in the distinction between Western 
low context culture and Eastern high context culture (Hall, 1976). 
We particularly focus on the difference between the rule-based 
inference more common in low-context Western cultures and the 
dialectical inference more common in high-context Eastern cultures, 
and we argue that rule-based inference using global rules is more 
adaptive in low context cultures. 
Keywords: Culture; Psychology; Reasoning; Cross-cultural 
analysis. 
 
1. Cultural Differences in Cognition 
Nisbett (2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) 
reviewed previous studies on cultural differences in 
cognition and described the differences in terms of a 
distinction between analytic and holistic cognition. He 
argued that individuals from Western cultures are more 
likely to engage in analytic cognition, whereas individuals 
from Eastern cultures are more likely to engage in holistic 
cognition. According to his definition, analytic cognition 
involves detachment of the object from its context, a 
tendency to focus on attributes of the object to assign it to a 
category, and a preference for using rules about the 
categories to explain and predict the object’s behavior. In 
contrast, holistic cognition is oriented towards context or the 
field as a whole, attention to relationships between a focal 
object and the field, and a preference for explaining and 
predicting events on the basis of such relationships.  
     The distinction between analytic and holistic can be 
described in terms of four dimensions: context-dependent/ 
independent, dispositional/situational attribution, rule-based/ 
dialectical, and stable/changeable views. In terms of the 
third dimension (rule-based vs. dialectical), people from 
Western cultures are more inclined to employ rule-based 
thinking, whereas people from Eastern cultures are more apt 
to employ dialectical thinking (Buchtel & Norenzayan, 
2008; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rogers, Boucher, 
Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009). For example, Norenzayan, 
Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002) reported that, when being 
asked which group an object should belong to 
(categorization task), Americans tended to focus on a single 
property (rule-based inference), whereas Koreans tended to 
respond based on family resemblance (intuitive inference). 
Peng and Nisbett (1999) proposed that the cognitive style of 
Chinese was dialectical, whereas the cognitive style of 
Americans was rule-based.  
 
2. Nisbett’s Explanations for the Cultural 
Differences in Cognition 
Nisbett et al. (2001) explained the distinction between 
Western analytic and Eastern holistic cognition by using the  
cultural value dimensions that underlines the individualist 
and collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1995). They discussed 
how each style is adaptive within its own cultural type. We 
regard culture as a hypothetical construct to explain people’s 
behavior as well as to describe social patterns. In the long 
history of cultural studies, it has been claimed that Western 
societies have established individualist cultures, whereas 
Eastern societies have developed collectivist cultures 
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(Triandis, 1995). The distinction between individualist and 
collectivist culture is a hypothetical concept proposed to 
explain the observed differences in behavior, such as that 
people from Eastern cultures have a stronger preference for 
sociability and interdependence than do people from 
Western cultures. Markus and Kitayama (1991) connected 
this distinction to two kinds of selves. They postulated that, 
in general, Western cultures foster and favor an independent 
self, whereas Eastern cultures foster and favor an 
interdependent self. This distinction refers to differences in 
how people view themselves: people from Western cultures 
are likely to view themselves as individualistic, ego-centric, 
and discrete from society, whereas people from Eastern 
cultures are more inclined to view themselves as 
collectivistic, socio-centric, and related to others and to their 
society.  
     Nisbett (2003, Nisbett et al., 2001) argued that in a 
collectivist culture it is adaptive to attend not only to an 
object itself but also to its context in order to keep the 
harmony, hence Eastern cultures’ holistic cognition is 
practiced and facilitated. More recently, Nisbett has said he 
prefers an explanation based on the personal level, in other 
words on the concept of self-construal (e.g., Varnum, 
Grossman, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010).  
     The both explanations of Nisbett’s are compatible 
with the results of something called "cultural priming." As 
already mentioned, it is assumed that Western cultures foster 
development of an independent self, whereas Eastern 
cultures promote development of an interdependent self 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Cultural priming is the 
mechanism that makes either independent or interdependent 
self-construal accessible, and the accessible self-construal in 
turn affects the style of cognition. For example, Kühnen, 
Hannover, and Schubert (2001) reported that participants 
who were asked to point out the differences between 
themselves and their friends or parents (primed as 
independent self-construal) showed a tendency to process 
stimuli unaffected by the context (analytic cognition), 
whereas those who were asked to point out the similarities 
between themselves and their friends or parents (primed as 
interdependent self-construal) were more apt to do 
context-bounded thinking (holistic cognition).  
     For the distinction between rule-based inference and 
dialectical inference, Nisbett (2003) adds the importance of 
cultural tradition. The Western style of thinking has been 
heavily influenced by the philosophy of Ancient Greece, 
whereas the Eastern style of thinking grew out of the 
traditions of Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. 
Aristotle’s logic was accepted by many Western cultures as 
it is abstract and universal, whereas Eastern cultures 
preferred ideas that encouraged and reinforced the harmony 
of their society. For example, the dual concept of yin 
(negative aspects of the world) and yang (positive aspects of 
the world) form the central essential of Taoism, describing 
how polar opposites or seemingly contrary forces are in 
reality interconnected and interdependent. It reflects the 
tradition of Chinese ontology that the world is constantly 
changing and shifting, like the balance between yin and yang, 
and is full of contradictions. Nisbett concludes that the 
Chinese view the world as easy to change (e.g., Ji, Nisbett, 
& Su, 2001), hence abstract rules are not useful for 
predicting future events or guiding behavior.  Nisbett 
postulates that this is why the Chinese (and thus Easterners) 
are less likely to use rule-based inference. 
     In short, these results support the view of cultural 
psychologists who assume that mind and culture are 
inseparable. In Western societies, people live in an 
individualist culture, develop independent self-construal, 
and thus are more likely to demonstrate analytic cognition, 
whereas people in Eastern societies live in a collectivist 
culture, develop interdependent self-construal, and are more 
apt to demonstrate holistic cognition. This view is 
summarized as the social orientation hypothesis (Varnum et 
al., 2010). 
     However, we see some problems with Nisbett’s 
(2003) explanation. The first is the alleged adaptive nature 
of Eastern cultures’ attention to contextual information. It 
may well be adaptive to pay attention not only to a target 
person (object), but to all in-group members (context) in 
order to maintain in-group harmony in a collectivist culture. 
However, strictly speaking, this cognitive style is adaptive 
only in the field of person cognition in a collectivist culture. 
How can this person cognition be transferred to objects and 
their context?  
     Secondly, if Eastern cultures view the world as 
changeable, the question is whether they try to predict those 
changes using rules such as yin and yang. However, Nisbett 
(2003) takes his interpretation of the Eastern view as fact, 
and infers that the concept of yin and yang reflects this view.  
 
3. Low Context and High Context Cultures 
3.1 Hall’s (1976) Definition 
In order to resolve the problems above, we propose an 
explanation based on the distinction between low context 
and high context culture. Hall (1976) introduced a dominant 
cultural dimension called context to explore the relationship 
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between culture and communication. His interest was built 
upon the need to understand the factors that facilitate or 
inhibit effective communication between individuals from 
different cultural backgrounds. In explaining this key 
cultural dimension, Hall and Hall (1990) integrated three 
main concepts: context, information, and meaning. These 
three concepts encapsulate context as a system of meaning 
for information exchanges between groups of people or 
within a group of people. They further argued that context is 
embedded in information for the purpose of creating 
meaning in a message. In other words, without information 
or context, a message is deemed to be without meaning, 
therefore insignificant.  
     With this understanding, Hall’s context dimension 
provides a framework that enables people to comprehend 
communication forms ranging from the purely non-verbal 
— hand gestures, body language, facial expressions, and 
tone of voice (all of which are situational and important in 
high context cultures) — to the purely verbal, such as 
written text or spoken words (all of which are informational 
and important in low context cultures), in order to achieve 
meaning as the ultimate goal. Zakaria and Cogburn (2010) 
summarized it thus: high context is known as ‘content 
independent’, while low context is known as ‘context 
independent.’ There is some evidence that, generally 
speaking, Western cultures are low context whereas Eastern 
cultures are high context. For example, Ishii, Reyes, and 
Kitayama (2003) reported that Americans spontaneously 
attend more to verbal content than to vocal tone, whereas 
Japanese attend more to vocal tone than to verbal context. 
This evidence suggests that Japanese prefer indirect and 
implicit communication while Americans prefer direct and 
explicit communication. In their analysis of websites, Würtz 
(2006) found that websites created by Japanese, Chinese, 
and Koreans, who are from presumed high context cultures, 
adopted the visual effects offered by the Internet to convey 
their messages efficiently to a greater degree than did sites 
created by Germans, Americans, and Northern Europeans, 
who are from presumed low context cultures.  
     In this paper, we propose that the distinction between 
high context and low context cultures (the L/H context 
dimension) (Hall, 1976) offers a better explanation for 
cultural differences in cognition than the distinction between 
individualism and collectivism (the I/C dimension).  
     People in a high context culture can interpret 
messages from others without full descriptions, because 
implicitly shared information is available to assist the 
interpretation. For example, if people implicitly share the 
idea that a diamond is very expensive and normally used for 
special occasions, then given the statement ‘A presented a 
diamond ring to B’ they may infer that A is proposing 
marriage to B.  Therefore, a speaker can notify you of A’s 
proposal just by saying that A presented a diamond ring to B 
without further information on marriage. On the other hand, 
people in a low context culture need explicitly expressed 
words for communication, because they have little or no 
implicitly shared information to draw on. Hence, they rely 
on communication which rests upon direct and explicit 
communication.  
     As for the problem of the transference from person 
cognition to objects, the explanation using the H/L context 
distinction does not need to rely on transference. According 
to Ishii et al. (2003) using the H/L context distinction can 
explain the degree of contextualization, and the degree of 
how people attend contextual or situational information, 
which are the first two aspects of the dimension between 
analytic and holistic cognition. In a high context culture, 
people’s attention is attuned to contextual information 
because they are accustomed and encouraged to use this 
information for communication, whereas in a low context 
culture, people’s attention is directed towards the target they 
want to identify. It is highly plausible that this cultural 
training affects people’s cognition in each culture.  
3.2  The H/L Context Distinction as an 
Explanation for Cultural Differences in the Usage 
of Rules 
     The H/L context distinction can also provide an 
explanation for cultural differences in the usage of rules. The 
outline of our argument is as follows;  
(1) A global rule is needed when a local rule becomes 
useless.  
(2) A local rule becomes useless when natural laws and/or 
social customs are variable.  
(3) Social customs are more variable in low context 
(Western) cultures than in high context (Eastern) cultures.  
(4) Eastern high context cultures’ dialectical inference is not 
based on global rules but on local rules, while the opposite is 
true of Western low context cultures.  
(5) Therefore, Western low context cultures are more 
inclined to use rule-based inference than Eastern high 
context cultures.  
This explanation resolves the problem of why the Chinese, 
for example, are less inclined to use rules to describe 
changes that they perceive in the world: because by and 
large they encounter less variability in their local world and 
therefore local practice remains useful.  
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     Why have scientific theories been needed for 
humans? Rules are used to describe the world in terms of 
natural laws, and to predict consequences. Although they do 
not give direct suggestions for human action, they are useful 
in gaining resources (benefits) or avoiding hazards. For 
example, it is adaptive for people to learn the follow law in a 
hunter-gatherer society: 
 
If you go to the river in autumn, you can catch salmon. 
 
People learn that they can catch salmon every autumn and 
thus can smoke salmon for eating through the winter. A 
scientific theory may give an explanation for why one can 
catch salmon in autumn. If the law is always true, and you 
can count on the appearance of the salmon every year, 
theories are not necessary. However, theories which describe 
the biological mechanisms, habits or behavior of salmon 
become useful when there are no salmon one autumn. These 
theories may explain why this situation has occurred and 
give people some idea how to deal with it: give up fishing, 
move to another place, or clean the river. Therefore, theories 
are needed when the environment is not stable, and its 
natural laws are irregular.  
     However, we do not assume that the cultural 
differences in the tendency to seek for a global rule arise 
from differences in environmental variability between West 
and East. Rather, we focus on any rule which is used as a 
cultural coordination device. It takes the form of a deontic 
conditional, which codifies obligation, permission, and 
inhibition. For example, Tom fell in love with a girl whose 
name was Anne when he lived in her country. He wants to 
marry her, hence he presents her with a diamond ring based 
on the following belief: 
 
If Anne wishes to marry Tom, she accepts the diamond 
which Tom presents her.  
 
However, it is quite possible that this rule cannot be applied 
in another culture where people do not share the common 
belief that a diamond is a marriage gift. If Anne lives in such 
a society, she may not accept the diamond even if she wants 
to marry Tom because the rule that Anne knows is as 
follows: 
 
If Anne wishes to marry Tom, her father accepts an amount 
of money from Tom.  
 
Tom may find out or figure out this rule, give money to 
Anne’s father, and marry Anne. However, it is more adaptive 
for them both to know the reasons for the two different 
rules: that is, the principle of a marriage gift in order to have 
a happier life. If they know the reasons, they can abandon 
the old local rules and create new, more global, rules when 
their child gets married.  
     We propose that local rules are less useful in a low 
context culture than in a high context culture. The case of 
the marriage of Tom and Anne is a typical example: the 
variability between their backgrounds means that their local 
rules differ, and acting on them leads to miscommunication. 
In a nutshell, a global or fundamental rule is necessary when 
a local rule becomes useless. Cross-cultural studies indicate 
that people raised in Western cultures prefer more global 
rules than those raised in Eastern cultures. For example, the 
results of Norenzayan et al. (2002) cited above showed that 
Americans preferred to categorize based on formal rules, 
whereas Koreans inferred based on family resemblance.  
We propose that the rules used by the Americans are more 
global than the family resemblance used by the Koreans. 
Family resemblance consists of set of local rules, and each 
rule is not true for all members of a category. 
Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, and Peng (2009) 
claim that Eastern cultures’ dialecticism is naïve, by which 
they mean that Eastern cultures are more likely to retain 
some local rules which are contradictory of each other, 
without resolving the contradiction. Therefore, Eastern 
cultures’ inference is also more local than Western.  
     The relationship between environmental variability 
and the necessity of local and global rules are shown in 
Figure 3. A global rule is not necessary if natural laws or 
social customs are completely stable. It is needed if the local 
rule based on natural law or social customs becomes useless. 
Therefore, the lower the utility of local rules, the higher the 
necessity of global rules. However, in a completely chaotic 
situation a global rule is not useful either. Hence, the need 
for global rules describes an A-shaped curve, as shown in 
Figure 1. In this figure, focusing on the H/L context 
distinction, we consider the variability of social customs on 
the horizontal axis and necessity of a rule on the vertical axis. 
Social customs are stable in a high context culture, hence it 
can be located on the left, whereas a low context culture can 
be located in the middle where social customs are variable to 
some extent (but not enormously so). However, Nisbett 
(2003; Nisbett et al., 2001) argues that the Chinese view the 
world as more changeable than Westerners do, hence he 
locates the Chinese culture further to the right, where the 
environment is not stable. This is contradictory with the idea 
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that Chinese culture is high context, and may therefore be 
wrong. In short, we cast doubt on Nisbett’s argument that 
Chinese dialectical thinking is based on their view that the 











Figure 1: Relationship between Variability and Necessity.  
 
3.3 Reinterpretation of the Experimental Results 
on Cultural Priming 
     How can the results of cultural priming be explained 
based on the H/L context distinction?  Studies on cultural 
priming by Kühnen et al. (2001) are one reason for 
considering an explanation based on the I/C dimension. 
They assumed that participants who were asked to consider 
the differences between themselves and their parents or 
friends activated their independent self-construal, whereas 
participants who were asked to consider the similarities 
between themselves and their parents or friends activated 
their interdependent self-construal.  
     However, it is possible that their experimental 
manipulation changed the degree of their participants’ 
feeling of shared context with other people. Asking people 
to consider differences between themselves and their parents 
or friends may activate their belief that others are different 
from themselves, and thus they are not able to rely upon the 
information which they share with others for communication. 
On the other hand, asking them to consider similarities 
between themselves and their parents or friends may activate 
their belief that others are similar to themselves. In other 
words, the former brought participants to a low context 
situation whereas the latter brought them to a high context 
situation.  
3.4  Accounting for Cultural Diversity 
     Our more ambitious aim is to connect the L/H context 
distinction to the explanation for cultural diversity using 
natural, ecological, and geographical factors. In other words, 
not only to explain cultural differences in cognition using 
the L/H context distinction, but to explain the distinctions 
themselves using natural, ecological, and geographical 
factors. The ecological bases for individualism and 
collectivism have been intensively discussed. The person 
level of social independence can be intermediate between 
their group life style and their analytic cognitive style. These 
studies are known as a socioecological approach (Oishi & 
Graham, 2010).  
     We do not deny these discussions. However, the L/H 
context distinction may be explicable by natural factors as is 
the I/C distinction. This problem is too large to fully discuss 
here; we simply point out some factors contributing to the 
difference between low context and high context culture, 
which lead people to either rule-based inference or 
dialectical inference respectively.  
     The concept of the L/H context distinction is often 
employed by researchers in human communication. When 
people perform intercultural communication, both parties 
are in effect in a low context situation because they share 
fewer implicit assumptions than when they communicate 
with someone from their own culture. This idea is a 
developed version of Langer (1989), who argued that 
mindful communication is needed for intercultural 
communication. His concept of ‘mindful’ communication 
can be interpreted as explicitly deliberate and careful 
communication in which people read others’ minds when 
there is a lack of shared implicit assumptions.  
     Since a low context situation arises when people 
engage in intercultural communication, a low context culture 
is more likely to develop in a multicultural environment 
(one in which people from different cultures keep their own 
culture but interact with each other). This situation also 
creates an environment wherein local rules become useless 
more often.  
     A geographical factor that reinforces a multicultural 
environment is when there is no spacious plain which can 
become the place for a large culturally unified society; 
societies must therefore remain geographically separated. In 
order for multicultural conditions to arise and persist, 
however, these different cultural societies must interact with 
each other -- for example, if each society is not 
economically self-sufficient, and can prosper only if it trades 
with other societies. An ecological factor that enhances the 
likelihood of trade is an unbalanced distribution of resources 
among these societies. One place that satisfied all these 
conditions was Ancient Greece.  
 
4. Conclusion: A New Framework 
The primary goal of this paper is to propose a possible 































the analytic cognition practiced by Western cultures and the 
holistic cognition practiced by Eastern cultures, using the 
distinction between low context culture in the West and high 
context culture in the East instead of the distinction between 
Western individualist culture and Eastern collectivist culture.  
     Summarizing these points, we propose a framework 
as shown in Figure 2. In order to explain cultural diversity 
naturalistically, we give the primary role to geographical and 
ecological factors.  People need rule-based inference in a 
low context culture, but whether a low context culture 
(multicultural environment) arises depends on these factors. 
Our framework is contrasted with that of cultural 
psychologists (e.g., Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001), who 
assume that culture and mind are inseparable and emphasize 
the role of self-construal in culture and cognitive style. By 
contrast, we propose that culture and context are inseparable 
and, as such, that context has a strong connection to the 
types of information required in order to draw effective 
meanings or sense-making into the thinking process.  
 
           Individualism – Independent self – Analytic cognition 
Culture  
          Collectivism – Interdependent self – Holistic cognition 
 
             (a)  Nisbett and colleagues 
 
                  Low context culture – Rule-based inference 
Geographical       (Multi-culture)      Decontextualized cognition 
and ecological 
factors           High context culture – Dialectical inference 
                  (Mono-culture)     Contextualized cognition 
 
              (b) Proposed naturalistic framework 
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